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Introduction
While sorting through some old papers recently, I came
across a paper that I had completed, probably early in
1957, on ‘New Zealand in the World Economy 1938-
56’. This had been intended to be a contribution to a book
on ‘Contemporary New Zealand’, on which a group of
us at Victoria University College were collaborating –
Ken Scott, Kingston Braybrooke, Winston Monk and
myself being the main contributors. Tragically, Winston
was killed in an aircraft crash at Singapore early in 1954.
I became involved in assisting a Royal Commission in
1955. The other contributors also became involved with
tasks of higher priority. Accordingly, the project was never
completed, and my paper was never published.
Economic historians to whom I showed the paper
have encouraged me to publish it now, with a brief
introduction and minor modifications to avoid
misunderstandings about the timing of events. Thinking
back to the period during which this piece was written,
one of them recalled how little independent research and
informed commentary on important domestic and external
economic issues were going on in New Zealand at the
time. The first of the Economic Surveys produced by the
Treasury did not appear until 1951. The sections on the
history of the financial system that Albert McGregor
and I prepared for the report of the Monetary
Commission, presented early in 1956, were a significant
semi-official contribution.
The dearth of economic research in the mid-1950s
was noted by the Commission. Thanks to the efforts of
Professor Horace Belshaw and some farsighted business
people and officials, the New Zealand Institute of
Economic Research was established in 1958. The relative
lack of informed independent comment on economic
issues through the New Zealand media and academic
community was reflected in the decision by the National
Government to set up the Monetary and Economic Council
in 1961 as an independent ‘economic watchdog’. Thus
the following analysis, produced in the mid-1950s, is of
some intrinsic interest for its scarcity value. My
qualifications for writing it had been enhanced by my
having been the lesser half of the Economic Division of
the External Affairs Department, under Lloyd White,
from 1949 until 1952.
A Dependent Economy
Despite the development of domestic manufacturing
over the previous two decades, New Zealand remained
a highly dependent economy in 1956. It was peculiarly
sensitive to change in conditions in the markets for its
products overseas. A large proportion of real income
continued to be derived from imports; it still relied
almost entirely upon the sale of a small number of
pastoral products, subject in the past to wide fluctuations
of price, to earn the foreign exchange necessary to
maintain the flow of those imports; and between two-
thirds and three-quarters of exports were normally sold
in a single market, the United Kingdom.
The proportion of export trade going to the United
Kingdom dropped after the war to about 67% in 1954-
55, compared with over 80% in 1938-39. This was due
primarily to the sharp increases which had taken place in
the price, and therefore the relative importance in the
export trade, of wool. Wool was sold by auction to
a large number of countries. Well over 90% of meat
and dairy produce was still normally sent to the
British market.
Factors Underlying New Zealand’s
Export Policy in Respect of Meat and
Dairy Produce
Given the relative importance of dairy produce and meat
in export trade, it was to a large extent inevitable that
New Zealand must put a great proportion of its ‘eggs’
in the United Kingdom basket. Britain still remained
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the world’s best customer for these products. The
concentration of exports there during the period was
not due solely to the pull of the British market, but
also in some measure to the policy of the New Zealand
Government. This policy was based partly on a desire
for security and partly, especially during and
immediately after the war, on a desire to ease the burden
borne by the people of the United Kingdom.
The Desire for Security
The Labour Government promised the people of New
Zealand security against the “poverty, unexampled
unemployment, farm bankruptcy and general
stagnation” of the depression years. To this end, it
placed its faith internally in a policy of guaranteed
prices and minimum wages; social security; promotion
and protection of domestic industries; easy credit for
farmers, manufacturers and home builders; and the
expansion of public works and state housing.
Externally, the Government advocated “negotiations
with the United Kingdom and other countries with the
main view of expanding markets for our primary
products on a reciprocal trade basis”. In the years
before the war, the sole reciprocal trade agreement
reached was one with Germany in 1937. Shortly after
the outbreak of war, however, the British Government
undertook to purchase specified quantities of meat,
butter and cheese at agreed prices for the 1939-40
season. Similar arrangements were made between the
two governments in subsequent seasons on an annual
basis for these and other minor export products.
1944 saw the conclusion of long-term contracts for
the bulk-purchase of exportable surpluses of meat,
cheese, butter and certain milk products until the 1947-
48 season. Prices were fixed for the first two seasons
but subject to review thereafter, no limits being fixed.
In 1946, the period of the contracts for meat, butter
and cheese was extended until July 1950. In 1948,
the contracts were further extended until the 1954-55
season. This time, a limitation of 7.5% was placed
on the extent to which prices could be varied in any
one year.
Thus, the Labour Government could claim that it
had assured the country of a market for all its meat and
dairy produce, and after 1948, of a reasonable degree
of stability in their prices. This was not the reciprocal
trade agreement which it had originally envisaged; nor
were the provisions of the contracts exactly what the
Government had wished. Mr Nash’s suggestion earlier
in the war that meat and dairy prices should be linked
to the prices of British goods imported into New
Zealand was rejected by the British Government.
Nevertheless, at the time, the negotiation of the
agreements was generally regarded as a satisfactory
achievement. Towards the close of the war and in the
early  post-war years, it was widely believed that New
Zealand would, within a relatively short time, be faced
once again with the problem of surpluses of farm
products in world markets. Surpluses could arise either
as a result of increased agricultural efficiency and the
possibility of declining populations in food-importing
countries, or a slump in the major industrial nations of
the west like that which followed the First World War.
There was therefore little objection to an agreement
which limited the annual upward movement of
prices to 7.5% when it provided an assurance that
prices could not fall in any one year by more than the
same percentage.
Sentiment
The desire for security was not the only motive behind
the Government’s participation in the bulk-purchase
contracts. Despite the existence of premia in other
markets, the New Zealand negotiators, up till 1950,
were willing to commit themselves to send to the
United Kingdom virtually all the exportable surplus
of meat and a minimum of 97% of the exportable
surplus of dairy produce.
An indication of the general feeling in political
circles on this matter can be gauged from an exchange
which took place in the House of Representatives in
1947. A National Member of Parliament, later a Cabinet
Minister, asked the Minister of Finance to make a
public announcement to allay fears which he said had
arisen from a press message that, as a result of the
GATT negotiations, markets for New Zealand butter
might become available in the United States. Such
action, he claimed, would have a seriously adverse
effect on the drive for more food for Britain. He was
assured that there was no intention of sending any
butter, cheese or meat to any country other than Britain.
There is little doubt that considerations of sentiment
were allowed to enter quite strongly into negotiations
with the United Kingdom under the agreements.
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An indication of the Labour Party’s attitude to the
question was given in the Address-in-Reply debate in
the House in October 1951 when Mr Nash expressed
the view that it was “dangerous to let our blood and
spiritual ties with Britain slip in any way for anything
that might be financially or economically advantageous”
to New Zealand.
He had never been able to see why, if New Zealand
could organise its economy to produce foodstuffs at
reasonable cost, it should take advantage of Britain’s
need to ask it to pay more. It was not right to sell butter
to Ireland for a higher price than Britain paid, while
Ireland used its land to raise beef to sell to America for
dollars and Britain had to cut its rations. He implied
also that selling food to Britain at relatively low prices
was one way of fulfilling “our duty to carry our share
of the excessive load of defence expenditure formerly
borne by Britain”.
These views were not confined to the Labour Party;
there was a widespread feeling that New Zealand
should do something along these lines to ease the
burdens of the British people. The gift of £10 million
sterling to Britain, the continuation of butter rationing
until 1950 to release supplies for export, the large
number of food parcels sent privately to the United
Kingdom are further indications of the sentiment
prevailing immediately after the war. This desire to
help was mainly altruistic, but not entirely so. It was
vital for New Zealand that the United Kingdom should
regain its prosperity – as Mr Nash put it, “we must help
Britain to be our best customer” – and it was hoped that
New Zealand’s actions might set an example for others
to follow suit. Moreover, many felt that the help offered
might build up a store of goodwill for New Zealand
in the United Kingdom which would be useful in
future negotiations.
Effects of the Contracts and Later
Developments
As time went on, concern increased, especially among
the farming community, at the fact that the prices
obtained by New Zealand under the contracts were
considerably below the prices paid to other suppliers of
the United Kingdom. Moreover, despite annual increases
obtained under the agreements, it was not until the
outbreak of the Korean war brought exceptionally high
wool prices that the terms of trade – i.e., the quantity of
imports obtain able for a unit of exports – were as
favourable to New Zealand as they had been in the three
years before the war, as the following table shows.
Year or Quarter Import Prices Export Prices Terms of Trade
(1)
1936 35 29 83
1937 37 34 92
1938 37 32 85
1939 37 31 84
1940 43 36 83
1941 48 36 76
1942 52 37 72
1943 58 39 67
1944 61 41 67
1945 62 44 71
1946 69 48 70
1947 82 61 74
1948 84 68 80
1949 77 65 85
1950 84 92 110
1951 98 108 111
1952 107 87 81
1953 101 97 96
1954 100 100 100
1955 101 101 100
Table 1. Terms of Trade (Base:1954=100)
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This had been a period when the rate of exchange
between foodstuffs and manufactured goods in the world
as a whole had moved strongly in favour of the former.
Some compensation for the adverse movement in the
terms of trade during the war had been received when,
in 1944, the United Kingdom agreed to make to the New
Zealand Government a lump-sum payment of £12m,
with further amounts of £4m per annum for the next four
years, to cover steep increases in import prices.
But the continuation of the adverse position of the
terms of trade made it obvious that it was possible to pay
too high a premium for future security when stabilisation
measures were confined to a major buyer and a major
seller of only one or two commodities, and the prices of
other commodities, or the prices of the same commodities
in other markets, were rising rapidly. Farmers also
began to ask why the cost of helping Britain should not
be spread over the whole community rather than
concentrated on the meat and dairy industries. Pressure
built up for greater exploitation of opportunities in other
markets and for a relaxation of the limits on price
increases under the agreements.
The new High Commissioner in London was
swimming against the tide in 1951 when he remarked in
a press interview that New Zealand had been very happy
indeed to sell meat to Britain at a cheaper rate than it
paid other countries. This was evident from the storm
of protest from the farming industry and the
embarrassment of Ministers which followed the
publication of his remarks.
In the event, changes were negotiated in the terms of
the contracts from the 1950-51 season. In the case of
dairy produce, the 7.5% price limit was maintained, but
greater sales to other markets were permitted.1  New
Zealand continued to commit almost all its exportable
surplus of meat to the United Kingdom, but the 1951-52
season prices were increased beyond the 7.5% limit – in
fact, by an average of about 15% – following the
granting by the United Kingdom of substantial increases
to other suppliers. In 1952-53, the legal price limit was
extended to 10%. Provision was made for even this
limitation to be waived if proved costs of production in
New Zealand moved by more than 10% in any one year.
For the 1952-53 season, an overall average price increase
of about 12.5% was obtained.
Another development of some importance was the
assurance given by the Ministry of Food in 1952 that the
United Kingdom would take New Zealand’s exportable
surplus of meat for the next 15 years. For that period,
therefore, New Zealand was freed from the fear of the
possible imposition of quotas on meat to the United
Kingdom, which caused such anxiety in the 1930s.
In 1951, the Australians obtained not only a long-
term agreement similar to New Zealand’s in respect of
meat, but also a minimum price guarantee until 1967. In
exchange for this, they agreed to limit the amount of
meat which they sold outside the United Kingdom and
that prices during the first three years of the agreement
would be increased only to the extent that increased
costs of production could be proved. The New Zealand
producers did not want such limitations. They did not
press for a minimum price guarantee at that time. The
possibility of such a guarantee was raised by New
Zealand at negotiations in 1953, but by then the British
Government was not prepared to consider the suggestion.
The Ministry of Food was not willing to extend to
dairy produce the provisions of the long-term undertaking
on meat. When he was approached by the New Zealand
Government early in 1953, Major Lloyd George indicated
that he was sympathetic to the request, but that the time
was “not yet opportune” for such an undertaking –
probably because the market for dairy products was
showing signs of weakness. A year previously he had
said that Britain wanted all the butter and cheese New
Zealand could send, then and for as far ahead as it was
possible to see.
New Zealand was spared the necessity of debating
the pros and cons of further extending the bulk-purchase
contracts because the Conservative Government in the
United Kingdom decided in 1953 that rationing and
price control of meat and dairy products would end in
1954. Their import would be restored to private trade,
subject to suitable arrangements being made with regard
to existing contracts for the remainder of their term.
Both the Meat Producers’ Board and the Dairy
Products Marketing Commission in fact decided to
accept the invitation of the Ministry of Food to terminate
the contracts in 1954, one year before their expiry date.
The Dairy Commission, however, managed to secure
the agreement of the Ministry to certain conditions
designed to safeguard producers as far as possible against
the possibilities of excessive purchases by the United
Kingdom of surplus butter from the United States; of
better terms being offered to other suppliers than the
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fairly substantial price reductions stipulated by the
Ministry for continuing the New Zealand contract; and
of indiscriminate disposals of stocks of butter and cheese
held by the Ministry.
The Dairy Commission prepared itself for the return
to freer trading by purchasing Empire Dairies Ltd in the
United Kingdom for the sale of butter and cheese. It also
established there the nucleus of a new milk power
marketing organisation and set up a patting plant of
its own. With an eye on the menace of margarine, it
also stepped up its advertising and publicity in the
United Kingdom, in conjunction with other dairy-
producing countries.
The market for meat remained buoyant after the
contracts were terminated. Cheese prices fell
considerably in the first year of decontrol, but receipts
were well sustained through 1956. The market was,
however, showing signs of weakness in the early months
of 1957, due to heavy increases in cheese production in
the United Kingdom. Receipts from butter were
satisfactory for the first two seasons after decontrol, but
prices then fell seriously, their level in February 1957
being about 30% lower than in February 1956.
This development, the possibility of increasing
exports of beef from the Argentine, the effects of
subsidisation of agriculture in the United Kingdom,
the United States and Europe and the accompanying
trade restrictions in the latter countries caused concern
among dairy and meat producers. At their request, a
trade mission led by the Deputy Prime Minister was to
arrive in London shortly after this essay was completed
early in 1957.
The purpose of their visit had not then been precisely
stated, but the leader of the mission had been quoted as
saying that an adjustment in the balance of advantage in
trade between New Zealand and the United Kingdom
was necessary; that the Ottawa agreement had placed
trade on a mutually advantageous basis; but that changing
circumstances had disturbed the balance adversely to
New Zealand. It appeared, then, since primary emphasis
was being placed on the critical situation facing butter
producers and on the possibility of substantially increased
supplies of beef from the Argentine, that New Zealand
would be asking for increased protection, probably in
the form of quotas, against exports from other countries.
Given the British Government’s policy, their
commitments under GATT and their reaction to
representations from Australia the previous year, it
seemed unlikely that the request would be conceded.
Alternative Markets in the
Dollar Area
It should not be assumed from the remarks made above
concerning the long-term contracts that, during the
period covered, New Zealand had foregone boundless
opportunities of profit from the sale of meat and dairy
produce in markets outside the United Kingdom. The
most important alternative markets lay in the dollar area.
The small tolerance for export of dairy produce to
other markets prior to 1950 undoubtedly led to the loss
of some opportunities for profitable sales of cheese and
minor dairy products there. But throughout the period
there was a complete embargo in the United States on the
import of butter (which of course, completely nullified
the value of the tariff concessions on that commodity
granted by the Americans under the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade).
Also, shortly after New Zealand obtained freedom to
sell greater quantities of cheese in other markets, the
United States placed quota restrictions on its importation
under the Defense Production Act. Since the quotas
were based on imports during the period 1948-50, when
New Zealand had done little to increase cheese exports
to America, they bore heavily on this country.
Later efforts to increase sales of dried milk powders
there were stifled by the imposition of further quota
restrictions in December 1952 and of a complete embargo
in April 1953.
These restrictions had been sustained until the time
of writing in 1957. The surpluses built up as a result of
the United States price support programme had been a
constant source of concern to New Zealand producers
and the Government. Frequent representations had been
made to the United States Government urging them to
consider the interests of a small country heavily dependent
on dairy produce exports when deciding where and how
to dispose of these surpluses. Fortunately, the stocks had
up till 1957 been largely liquidated without the serious
adverse effects which were from time to time forecast.
Similar difficulties prevented New Zealand from
taking advantage of the high prices for dairy products
ruling in Canada. No overt restrictions had been imposed,
but on several occasions New Zealand withheld intended
shipments of butter or cheese at the request of the
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Canadian Government. This cooperation not only saved
the Canadian Government some embarrassment with its
farmers and its price support programme, but also the
discomfort of putting the tongue too far into the cheek
when lecturing the Americans on the iniquity of
restrictions on imports of dairy produce.
The greatest opportunities lost were probably those
offered by the market for meat in the United States. The
price of meat there, although it remained considerably
higher than New Zealand’s contract prices, was not
bolstered up by any government support programme.
There were no restrictions on importation apart from a
relatively low tariff. Fairly strict rules about hygiene
were imposed. But it was not until 1951 that New
Zealand sent its first relatively small experimental
shipment of meat to the United States. It received prices
for lamb more than three times, and for boneless beef
about six times, higher than the British contract prices.
Subsequently, however, only one direct shipment of
meat had been made to the United States. This had to be
diverted to London because it failed to meet American
hygiene requirements.
In addition, a fairly large quantity of New Zealand
beef was diverted to the United States in 1952-3 on a
‘meat-switch’ arrangement with the United Kingdom
and Canada, whose meat had been denied entry to the
United States until an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease
in Saskatchewan had been completely eradicated. The
marketing of this meat appears to have been badly
handled by the Canadians, in that the low prices charged
and the areas chosen provoked opposition among the
meat interests in the United States.
For a time, it appeared likely that restrictions might
be placed on the importation of meat. Fortunately, no
action was taken but the experience made it clear that, if
New Zealand wanted to enter the American meat market
in any strength, it would have to be careful in the
selection of its marketing agents in order to ensure that
its produce was sold in a way that would provoke a
minimum of resistance from United States producers.
Despite the attractive financial rewards offering in the
United States, the Meat Producers’ Board appears to
have been deterred from attempting any significant
expansion of exports there. The main factors were
probably the cost of bringing New Zealand meat up to
American standards of processing, packing and hygiene,
and fear of the instability of America’s import policy.
Alternative Markets Elsewhere
The premia obtainable in Western European markets
for meat and dairy produce during the period of the
long-term contracts would seem to have been for
marginal quantities only. Most of these countries had
been applying quota restrictions in order to protect their
domestic producers. After the contracts expired, New
Zealand sent very little dairy produce there, except to
Western Germany in 1954-55. Exports of meat were
also small until 1954. Between then and 1957, a
significant proportion of the expanding exports of beef
was sold to Western Germany and Italy. The countries
of Western Europe were seen as most important
potential markets for meat and dairy produce, but it
was recognised that New Zealand’s ability to exploit
them would depend largely on their future agricultural
support and trade policies. The form of the proposals
for a Common Market in Europe then being
considered held out little hope of more liberal
treatment of New Zealand produce than it had received
in the past.
Sales of milk products, averaging about £250,000
had been made both in India and in Malaya in the last
three or four years. A survey of several other countries
in South and South East Asia by one of New Zealand’s
Trade Commissioners in 1951 indicated that, except
perhaps in Japan, there were only limited possibilities
for the sale of animal foodstuffs there. New Zealand
would in any case be hampered by the absence of a
direct shipping service to the countries concerned and
the lack of direct trade representation in the area. The
two latter defects were partially remedied by the opening
of a New Zealand diplomatic and trade office in
Singapore in 1955, and by the institution of more
frequent, though irregular, shipping services to Japan.
But the quantities of meat and dairy produce sold in the
area remained very small.
Political considerations clouded the issue of trade
with Communist countries but, in 1953 – at a time
when there was s marked tendency to weakness in the
market – 7,000 tons of dairy produce were sold to
Poland at good prices. No further sales of any great
importance had since then been made there or in any
other part of the Soviet bloc.
Overall, the picture was one of continued heavy
dependence on the United Kingdom to take the bulk of
New Zealand’s exportable surpluses of meat and dairy
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produce. This explains the deep concern of producers
about the agricultural support and trade policies adopted
by British governments.
Wool and the Joint Organisation
The United Kingdom also remained by far the best
customer for New Zealand’s wool. In 1954, for example,
of total wool exports of £88 million, the United Kingdom
took £42 million worth. Significant markets existed
elsewhere, such as France (£14 million in 1954);
Germany (£6 million); the United States (£6 million);
Italy (£3 million); Belgium (£3 million); USSR (£3
million); and the Netherlands and Poland (£2 million).
During the war, New Zealand’s exportable surplus
of wool was sent to the United Kingdom under a bulk-
purchase agreement, with provision for half the profits
obtained on the subsequent sale of wool outside the
United Kingdom to accrue to the New Zealand producers.
At the end of the war, the United Kingdom was holding
stocks of wool, accumulated under the bulk-purchase
agreements with New Zealand, Australia and South
Africa, equivalent to more than two years’ normal
exports from these three countries. It was estimated that
if serious dislocation of the market was to be avoided, it
would take 13 years to dispose of these stocks at auction
alongside the new clips becoming available. Agreement
was reached between the three Commonwealth exporting
countries and the United Kingdom to set up a Joint
Organisation to effect their gradual disposal.
Minimum or reserve prices were fixed at the
beginning of each season by agreement between the four
governments. The Organisation was required to buy in
wool if no other buyer would bid the reserve price or
better. In fact, wool prices remained buoyant after the
war and it was possible to dispose of all the accumulated
stocks at a good profit by 1952.
The success of the Joint Organisation made the New
Zealand Government and woolgrowers anxious to have
a similar reserve price scheme to replace it when it
expired. A scheme negotiated by the four governments
in 1950-51 failed to receive the approval of a referendum
of Australian woolgrowers and was consequently
abandoned. The New Zealand wool industry then decided
to institute a domestic reserve price scheme, for which
New Zealand’s share of profits of the Joint Organisation
had provided useful financial backing. No recourse had
been necessary by early 1957 to the reserves backing the
scheme. There was a marked slump in receipts after the
exceptional windfall of 1950-51 associated with the
Korean War, but after 1952-53, prices were sustained at
remarkably high levels, giving total receipts of over £90
million in the three years ending 1956.
Import Policy
The Administration of Import Control
New Zealand’s import policy was coloured by the desire
for security and the attachment to Britain which
influenced its export policy. The system of import and
exchange control instituted in 1938 was regarded by
the Labour Government as an integral part of its policy
to insulate New Zealand as far as possible from external
fluctuations. This system, involving as it did selection
of imports by classes of goods and by country of origin,
was bound to have adverse effects on certain overseas
interests. When it was first introduced, it provoked many
violent protests, especially among British and French
manufacturers.2   France was affected by the restrictions
imposed on such imports as fashionable apparel and
fancy goods. In 1939, the French woolbuyers operating
in New Zealand, apparently acting on instructions from
the French Government, threatened to boycott New
Zealand wool sales and turn their attention to the
Argentine, unless the Government was prepared to relax
its restrictions on French goods. Before any action had
been taken, however, the war intervened.
British manufacturers’ representatives in New
Zealand and the Federation of British Industries claimed
that the restrictions imposed in the interests of New
Zealand industries were inconsistent with Articles 7 and
8 of the Ottawa Agreement. In these Articles, New
Zealand had undertaken to give protection by tariffs
against British products only to those industries which
were “reasonably assured of sound opportunities of
success” and to give the British producers “full
opportunity of reasonable competition on the basis of
relative costs of economical and efficient production”.
Threats were made that the Federation would press
the British Government to abrogate the Ottawa
Agreement. Shortly afterwards discussions were held
between Hon. Walter Nash and United Kingdom
Ministers in London, and a memorandum was issued by
Mr Nash and Mr Oliver Stanley on 12 July 1939,
summarising the results. The United Kingdom
Government recognised that some action was necessary
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to reduce imports and did not object in principle to the
method adopted, but was apprehensive of the permanent
effects on British export trade of a policy designed to
meet temporary difficulties in New Zealand.
Mr Nash, for the New Zealand Government, said
that the policy would be administered as favourably as
possible in relation to British interests; that, as
circumstances permitted, the restrictions would be
relaxed to ensure the maximum expansion of trade
between Britain and New Zealand, consistent with the
maintenance of sound economic conditions in New
Zealand and the Government’s obligations to existing
industries; that the Government did not want to prevent
the United Kingdom producer from having full
opportunity of reasonable competition, but had already
encouraged the establishment of some industries which
it felt needed some protection to operate efficiently. He
undertook to investigate the position and not to extend
protection to other industries until his investigations
were completed.
Mr Nash agreed that licensing was not to be used to
foster uneconomic industries. The Government would
invite the views of British industries concerned when
considering what goods could be economically produced
in New Zealand. In addition, where the manufacture of
particular goods in New Zealand was to be restricted by
licence, British interests would be given the opportunity
to put forward proposals to undertake such manufacture.
It has been suggested that pressure for the relaxation
of restrictions was also exerted by the British authorities
in the financial sphere. The London Press generally
agreed that the onerous terms of the conversion issue
which the Government had to make in London in
respect of a sterling loan falling due in January 1940
were meant as a warning to New Zealand to adjust its
domestic policy so as to enable it to meet its commitments
without controls.
Whether the Labour Government was influenced by
these developments or not cannot be assessed; but it
administered the import control system in such a way as
to give most effective preference to the United Kingdom
in particular and to a lesser extent to other countries of
the Commonwealth and Empire. Throughout, the policy
was to maximise trade with Britain. If, as a result of the
war or of shortages in the early post-war period, it was
impossible to obtain imports from that source, preference
was given, as far as possible, to some other British
country. The United Kingdom was also singled out for
special treatment in 1949 when provision was made for
token imports from that source of certain articles for
which no allocation had been made in the licensing
schedule. It was not until the Labour Government’s last
import licensing schedule was issued in October 1949
that licences for the import of goods from all British
countries were made interchangeable.
In 1951, the National Government abolished this
preferential system of licensing by making all licences
interchangeable among soft currency countries. The
Labour Government’s policy must have been at least
partly responsible for the marked increase over the pre-
war level of the share of New Zealand’s import trade
given to the United Kingdom from 1948-50 after British
industry had recovered to some extent from the
dislocations of the war. In the five years before the war,
the share of the United Kingdom in New Zealand’s
import trade averaged about 49%. This fell away to
about 39% during the war and then gradually increased.
Between 1950 and 1956, the United Kingdom’s share
fluctuated around 55% of New Zealand’s import trade
Although some of the British firms making finished
consumers’ goods were adversely affected by import
control, their loss was more than compensated for by
the gains accruing to British exporters of producers’
materials and equipment. In addition, several of the
firms adversely affected by import control were able to
set up subsidiaries in New Zealand to produce their
goods here. It is not surprising in the circumstances that
the United Kingdom Government was willing, in 1948,
to allow the undertakings given in the Nash-Stanley
memorandum of 1939 to lapse.
The Labour Government’s policy was not as
beneficial to other Commonwealth countries as might
have been expected. India increased in importance as a
source of supply, especially of bags, sacks and woolpacks,
but Australia and Ceylon merely maintained their relative
positions. In the mid-1950s, Australia was beginning to
claim an increasing share of the market with its expanded
production of manufactured goods.
Tariff Preferences
In addition to the preference accorded under import
licensing for the majority of our period, the old tariff
preference system also remained relatively unscathed.
Reductions were made in margins of preference on some
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articles as a result of negotiations under the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, but the preferential
structure of the New Zealand tariff was not significantly
altered. For example, in the original negotiations at
Geneva, at which nearly all the concessions in respect
of preferences were made, 63% of the field of trade in
which preferences were accorded by New Zealand to
the United Kingdom remained unaffected, while only
2% were completely eliminated. The majority of the
concessions made were relatively small reductions of
preference margins.
From New Zealand’s point of view, the preferences
accorded in Commonwealth markets had been of little
significance in the bulk of the period under review.
There had been none of the marketing difficulties which
made so valuable the tariff preferences and the agreement
to refrain from imposing quotas on meat offered by
Britain at Ottawa in 1932 in exchange for preferential
concessions in Dominion markets. While meat and
dairy produce were sold to the United Kingdom Ministry
of Food under bulk-purchase contract, preferential
duties were of no assistance. In fact, New Zealand
was, if anything, at a disadvantage in comparison
with other suppliers.
There was a tendency in political circles, both Labour
and National, to treat the Imperial Preference system as
being of such inestimable benefit to New Zealand that its
value should not be questioned. In fact, a balanced study
of the value of the preference system to New Zealand
might show that, in the changed circumstances of the
post-war world, its advantages in bolstering up the
position of our main market, and giving us a potential
advantage over our competitors should conditions of
food surplus return in the future, were outweighed by the
disadvantages involved.
For example, the use of relatively highly-priced
British goods made costs higher than they needed to be
throughout the economy. There had been evidence that
British exporters had taken advantage of the shelter
afforded by the preferences to charge higher prices for
their goods in New Zealand than they did in more
competitive markets. There could also be some adverse
effect of the system on the economies of other countries
with which New Zealand traded and their reactions to it
had to be taken into account. The reduction or removal
of preferences could well be a highly useful bargaining
instrument in negotiations to secure more favourable
conditions of entry for New Zealand produce into markets
outside the United Kingdom.
Sources of Supply Outside the
United Kingdom
Despite the discrimination which existed in favour of
the United Kingdom and Commonwealth countries,
the post-war share of Belgium and France in New
Zealand’s import trade increased to some extent in
comparison with the five years before the war. After
1952, however, their share of the market tended to
decline, to about the pre-war levels. For the bulk of
the period, Germany and Japan, their economies
disrupted as a result of the war, provided only a small
proportion of our requirements. After 195l, Germany,
as a member of the European Payments Union, was
treated as a soft currency country. It increased its
exports significantly, surpassing its pre-war share of
the market in 1954.
Japan, on the other hand, had been regarded as a
‘scheduled country’ since the war. Judging by
statements made in the debates on the Japanese Peace
Treaty and by the negative attitude taken to Japan’s
application to accede to GATT, the Government was
anxious to avoid any commitment to grant most-
favoured-nation treatment to Japan or to abstain from
controlling imports from that source by import licensing.
As a consequence, Japan’s share of New Zealand’s
import trade remained below the pre-war level in 1956.
New Zealand and the
Dollar Problem
Reliance upon the United States for imports was greatly
increased during the war, with the disruption of
supplies from the United Kingdom and European
countries. In 1943, nearly 37% of New Zealand’s
imported supplies came from that source, as compared
with just over 34% from the United Kingdom. A large
proportion of the imports from America between 1942
and 1945 were, of course, lend-lease supplies.3
New Zealand in turn made large quantities of foodstuffs
and equipment available without charge to the United
States forces in the Pacific in accordance with the
Mutual Aid agreement concluded between the two
countries in September 1942. Canada also became
somewhat more important as a source of supply in the
latter years of the war. In 1943, Canada supplied 12%
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of New Zealand’s imports. In 1944, its share fell to
6%, but after the conclusion of a Mutual Aid
Agreement with New Zealand in June 1944, it rose
again to 9% in 1945.
With the termination of hostilities and of mutual aid,
the United States and Canada became of less importance
in New Zealand’s import trade, but their shares were
greater than they had been prior to the war. In 1947, the
United States supplied 18% and Canada 9% of New
Zealand’s imports as compared with 12% and 8%
respectively in the period 1934-39. However, after the
failure of the attempt to restore convertibility of sterling
in 1947, the New Zealand Government, in common with
other sterling area governments, had to impose severe
restrictions on dollar transactions in order to play its
part, firstly, in preventing the exhaustion of the central
reserves and ,secondly, in attempting to build them up to
a level which would enable the sterling area to escape the
perpetual atmosphere of crisis which characterised its
trade relations with the dollar area after the war.
In response to an appeal from the British Government
towards the end of 1947 to confine its imports from
scarce currency countries strictly to essentials, the Labour
Government secured a reduction of imports, in the case
of the United States from £23m in 1947 to £14m in 1948
and £ll.5m in 1949, and, in the case of Canada from
£12m in 1947 to £7m in 1948 and £5m in 1949. Again,
in July 1949, the Government agreed, in the light of the
recommendations of a Commonwealth Finance
Ministers’ Conference, to attempt to limit dollar imports
in 1950 to 75% of the value of imports in 1948. In fact,
this objective was exceeded, imports in 1950 being
almost one-third below the 1948 level.
At the Finance Ministers’ Conference in January
1952, the National Government agreed to aim at a
surplus with the non-sterling area at an annual rate of
£25 million by the end of June 1953, provided that wool
and other export prices remained at the levels prevailing
in January 1952. Again, the objective was exceeded by
about £5m. As a result of the continuation of import
licensing of dollar goods, and despite some relaxation in
the period 1954 to 1956, the share of Canada and United
States in our import trade remained significantly below
pre-war levels.
New Zealand governments were therefore
conscientious, even in years when the country achieved
a dollar surplus, in carrying out the obligations which
they assumed in the name of New Zealand as a
member of the sterling area. They were right to do so for
two main reasons.
Firstly, New Zealand itself derived considerable
advantages from the existence of the sterling area system.
Inter alia, it enabled us to enjoy the facility of unrestricted
trading with a large number of other countries without
concern as to New Zealand’s balance of payments with
each of them individually. It spared us the necessity of
setting up an elaborate network of banking services to
deal with the financing of New Zealand’s trade and the
painful process of building up its own reserves of gold
and dollars. Also, even if the dollar earnings fell off for
some reason, New Zealand was able to maintain its
essential dollar purchases, provided that reserves were
adequate and other members continued to pay surpluses
into the pool. In fact, between 1947 and 1956 New
Zealand’s deficits with the dollar area outweighed its
surpluses there by a net amount of about £50 million.
Against this, it should be mentioned that New Zealand
achieved regular and substantial surpluses with other
non-sterling countries, which reduced the necessity for
the United Kingdom to pay them gold and dollars under
the mechanism of the European Payments Union and
other agreements.
Secondly, the maintenance of the sterling area system
was vital to New Zealand’s main market at the time. As
the United Kingdom Economic Survey for 1952 pointed
out, if the central gold and dollar reserves were permitted
to run out, the people of the United Kingdom “would
soon find themselves unable to buy the imports of
food and raw materials upon which their livelihood
depends and there would be widespread want
andunemployment”. The preservation of the sterling
area system was therefore seen as a primary objective of
New Zealand’s foreign policy.
However, the necessity for sterling area countries to
restrict imports from the dollar area had most undesirable
effects on their economies. The alternative sources of
supply to which they had to turn usually offered less
suitable goods or less efficient machines, or involved
New Zealand importers paying much higher prices or
waiting much longer for delivery. As a result, costs and
prices were raised above the level which would have
prevailed if goods could have been imported freely from
the dollar area. The general standard of living and the
overall balance of payments position were thus worsened.
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For these reasons, it was in the interests of New
Zealand and other sterling area countries to follow
policies designed to increase their ability to improve
their competitive capacity in relation to the dollar area
and enable sterling to be made freely convertible once
again into dollars. However, the experience of attempting
to restore convertibility in 1947 had provided a warning
that it was easy to sacrifice the good in attempting to
achieve the perfect. New Zealand governments had
rightly felt that the balance of payments of the sterling
area and the level of the gold and dollar reserves would
need to be in a considerably stronger position than they
had been up to 1957 to enable complete freedom of
payments to the dollar area. Nevertheless, it had been
recognised as a goal well worth trying to achieve in the
longer run.
Overseas Borrowing
Unlike the governments of the United Kingdom, India
and Australia, the New Zealand Government had not
borrowed extensively for development purposes in the
dollar area. Here again the desire for security was a factor
bearing on policy. In 1931-32 when export receipts had
fallen to their lowest ebb, interest payments on New
Zealand’s external debt had been equivalent to almost
26% of the country’s export income. With the object of
removing such a millstone from the country’s neck
before any further depression arrived, the Labour
Government announced in its first Budget that its policy
would be “not only to refrain from further borrowing
abroad apart from conversion operations designed to
lighten the interest burden on the existing debt, but
to endeavour to reduce steadily the amount of
overseas indebtedness”.
The Government was able to do little to implement
this policy before the war because of pressure on the
exchange reserves. After the war, not only did it not
borrow overseas from any source, but also it paid off
about £60m stg. of external debt, gave the United
Kingdom £l0m stg., and lent £6m to France and
Czechoslovakia to help them purchase New Zealand
wool. As a result of this policy and of greatly increased
export receipts, interest payments on the overseas debt
fell to about 1% of export income in the early 1950s.
Faced with a rapidly rising population, adding to the
existing need for investment, the continuation of
inflationary pressure, a shortage of loanable funds, the
likelihood of continued pressure on the balance of
payments and the dollar problem still unsolved, the
National Government in 1953 took the rational decision
to resort once more to overseas borrowing for
development purposes. The amounts borrowed were at
first relatively small, partly because the Government
was unwilling to have undue recourse to external loans,
and partly because the amounts available from London,
the traditional source of finance had been limited and, in
the mid-1950s, relatively expensive.
About £25 million was raised in the United Kingdom
from 1953 to 1956 and $13 million of a $16 million loan
from the Export-Import Bank of the United States was
uplifted in 1956. The object of the latter was to finance
the dollar expenditure involved in the Muripara pulp and
paper project. The decision to attempt to raise a loan
from the United States was a significant step. Both major
New Zealand political parties had previously been
influenced to a considerable extent by opposition
expressed by certain groups, both on the left and the
right, to borrowing from there. The reasons ranged
from fear of domination by American financial
interests to concern as to New Zealand’s ability to
service any loan in the light of America’s unstable
agricultural import policy.
New Zealand’s Attitude in the
Negotiation of International
Economic Agreements
This is another factor, in addition to those already
reviewed, which helps to explain New Zealand’s attitude
to the international economic agreements which had
been negotiated during the period which we must
now discuss.
Dependent as it was on international trade, New
Zealand had been most severely affected by the disruption
of trade relationships which took place in the years
between the wars. The Labour Government was acutely
aware of the interdependence of national economies in
the modern world. It soon showed its determination to
play a full and active part in the discussions which began
among the Allied powers in the closing years of the war,
with the object of designing a system of international
economic co-operation to replace the topsy-turvy
system of unilateral action and retaliation characteristic
of the thirties. It soon showed too that it was to be
no pawn of the British or American governments.
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It had independent views on the matters of economic
policy under consideration.
From the start, New Zealand delegations stressed
the importance of economic and social problems in the
preservation of peace. They were in the vanguard of
those who advocated, successfully, that the original
draft of the United Nations Charter should be amended
to make an Economic and Social Council one of the
principal organs of the United Nations.
Throughout the negotiations leading up to the United
Nations and Havana Charters and the Articles of
Agreement of the Fund and Bank, New Zealand laid
primary emphasis on the maintenance of full
employment. The Government’s attitude was expressed
by Mr Nash in a statement to a plenary meeting of the
Conference on Trade and Employment in November
1947. He maintained that, if all countries maintained
full employment, “so-called trade restrictions, which
are symptomatic of deeper disorders, would to a large
extent be unnecessary”.
At the United Nations Conference on International
Organisation in 1945, against opposition from the
United States, New Zealand pressed successfully for
the United Nations Charter to include a pledge by all
members to co-operate and to take separate action to
promote full employment. (The opposition of the United
States was apparently based on the fear that a pledge to
take separate action might be construed as authorising
the United Nations to intervene in domestic affairs.)
Again, in the negotiations of the Havana Charter, New
Zealand and Australia were active in securing greater
emphasis on employment policy and economic
development than had appeared in the original
proposals, of which the rules of commercial policy had
been the core.
New Zealand was also determined to preserve the
right, under the trade and financial agreements, to
maintain its system of import and exchange control. In
the discussions on exchange restrictions during the
negotiations leading up to the Fund agreement, the
New Zealand delegation secured an assurance that its
system of exchange control, operated in conjunction
with import licensing, was not contrary to Article XIX
of the Agreement. The Article was merely to prevent
members from imposing exchange restrictions on
payments due for current international transactions. It
left them entirely free to determine, by methods other
than exchange restrictions, what transactions their
citizens might legally undertake.
In the commercial policy sections of the Havana
Charter and of GATT, New Zealand was among those
which successfully defended the propositions that
quantitative restrictions on imports should be permitted
to protect the balance of payments, and that members
should not be required to modify their domestic policies
of full employment or economic development on the
grounds that modification would render the restrictions
unnecessary. The Government’s attitude seems to have
been that, if New Zealand maintained its policies of full
employment and social security, balance of payments
difficulties were inevitable, and that therefore the
maintenance of import control could be continuously
justified. New Zealand, as might have been expected,
also upheld the right of underdeveloped countries to use
import controls as a means of protecting their infant
industries.
The Fund and Bank
Judging by the reports of the delegations to the
conferences and by statements by the Minister of
Finance, the Government was reasonably satisfied with
the final drafts of the Fund Agreement and the Havana
Charter. For example, of the former, Mr Nash said to
the Economic Society in Wellington in November 1944,
“I do not think there is anything yet inside international
discussion that is more potent for good than the
proposals of the conference at Bretton Woods”. He
expressed the hope that the agreement would come
before Parliament before the 1944 session was over.
However, a small group within the Labour Party, fearful
of potential United States control over New Zealand’s
exchange practices through its dominant voice in the
Fund, was able as a result of the Government’s slender
majority at the time and the declared opposition of the
Leader of the National Party to the Agreement to prevent
the Government from bringing it to a vote.
The National Party was also divided on the merits of
the Fund. In 1957, New Zealand, a country with
everything to gain from the promotion of consultation
and co-operation in matters of international finance,
quite apart from the assistance which it might derive
from the International Bank, remained, with the
Soviet bloc and one or two others, outside the Bretton
Woods institutions.
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GATT
Mr Nash was able to carry his party with him on the
issue of giving provisional application to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, although there were
obvious misgivings by one or two of those on the left
wing of the party. The National Party, except for one
member who later became Minister of External Affairs,
voted against the Bill on various grounds, including
the short period given for consideration of the
Agreement, the alleged threat to the system of Imperial
Preference and the fact that the Special Exchange
Agreement required represented a “back door to
Bretton Woods”.
Statements by Ministers in 1956 indicated that the
party had changed its views on the Agreement. It
recognised the benefit of the existence of a code of
behaviour in international trade and a useful exchange
of tariff concessions.
New Zealand had, however, found it impossible to
accept the terms of the Special Exchange Agreement
that members were required to sign if they were not
members of the Fund, probably because the Agreement
would carry most of the obligations (and few of the
benefits) of Fund membership. The Contracting
Parties had been willing to turn a blind eye to this
breach of the Agreement and grant the necessary
waivers. Likewise, there had apparently been no
criticism of New Zealand’s actions in maintaining
quantitative restrictions on imports purely for the
purpose of protecting domestic industry, in
contravention of the Agreement.
New Zealand had not failed to co-operate in GATT.
On the contrary, its record bore favourable comparison
with that of most other countries. If its actions had
adversely affected the interests of others, they would
no doubt have complained. Unfortunately, the
willingness of the Contracting Parties to make
concessions to the New Zealand Government had also
been extended to other members. For example, the
waivers granted to the United States to protect its
agricultural price support programmes by restrictions
on imports had helped to perpetuate a situation
unfavourable to New Zealand. The effectiveness of
New Zealand’s complaints about such restrictions
was inevitably reduced by the knowledge of
members of the policies New Zealand’s governments
had adopted.
ECOSOC and the Specialised
Agencies
The Economic and Social Council and its Specialised
Agencies were regarded as of primary importance by
the Labour Government. New Zealand delegations
exercised an influence quite out of proportion to the
size of the country in the work of the Council, of which
it was elected a member in 1946, and of its sub-
commissions (particularly in respect of the initiation of
annual reports on world economic conditions and of the
study of international action on full employment and
economic stability). Mr James Thorn of New Zealand
was elected president of ECOSOC in 1949 and New
Zealand officials were elected to executive office from
time to time in most of the Specialized Agencies.
Commodity Problems
As things turned out, the major problems of the post-
war period were problems of scarcity rather than those
of unemployment expected by many when the above
agreements were drafted. The problem of scarcity of
raw materials became particularly acute with the
acceleration of rearmament programmes in the United
States and other Western countries in 1950.
Early in 1951, on the initiative of the United States,
the United Kingdom and France, an International
Materials Conference was set up to consider what steps
should be taken to expand the supply and ensure the
most effective distribution of certain raw materials
which were in particularly short supply. New
Zealand was invited to participate in the work of
the Wool and Sulphur Committees of this Conference
and agreed to do so.
As a major exporter of wool, New Zealand was not
unhappy about the high prices to which wool had climbed.
On the other hand, the major importers of wool were
concerned that the price of wool, together with the prices
of other commodities, should be held down to reasonable
levels in order to prevent serious increases in the costs of
their rearmament programme and upward pressures on
prices generally. European countries especially wanted
supplies to be allocated so as to prevent unemployment
from arising due to material shortages.
Prior to the inception of IMC, the United States had
approached the governments of the main Commonwealth
wool exporting countries with a proposal that they might
permit the United States to buy its defence requirements
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at agreed prices before the main auctions were held.
The wool exporters apparently opposed this idea. In
November 1950, after a meeting between United States
and Commonwealth representatives in Australia, itwas
announced that it had been agreed that a pre-emptive
system of wool purchases could not be usefully
introduced at that time. In the prevailing circumstances,
the essential military needs of the United States
could be met without interfering with traditional
marketing methods.
However, as wool prices continued to rise rapidly at
the end of 1950 and early in 1951, the Americans
pressed strongly in the Wool Committee of IMC, when
it first met in April 1951, for an international allocation
scheme for wool. This would reduce competitive bidding
by importing countries for the available supplies. The
exporting countries, however, drew attention to the
practical difficulties involved in implementing an
allocation scheme for a commodity such as wool, with
its wide variety of types and grades. They claimed that
the American proposal would be impracticable. Whether
these objections were valid or merely special pleading is
impossible to determine in the absence of knowledge of
the exact nature of the American proposals. However,
wool was a much more complex commodity than the
others considered by IMC. The auction system was
considered to be the most efficient way of distributing
it in normal times. It was argued that very special
circumstances would have to exist to justify the
abandonment of the auction system for the complexities
and anomalies which were bound to arise under
any alternative.
In any case, by the third quarter of 1951, when the
United States proposals were still under discussion, it
was becoming apparent that the wool boom had passed
its peak. The United States Government had reduced its
purchases for military use and for stockpiling. It had
imposed price ceilings on wool in the United States.
With the easing of conditions in the wool market, buyers
in other countries also reduced their purchases in
anticipation of a further fall in prices.
Faced with these conditions, and with the fact that
their import prices were still rising rapidly, the attitude
of the wool exporters, including New Zealand, hardened
considerably. Negotiations broke down on 26 August
1951. The Wool Committee was officially retained in
existence for a year to keep the supply and demand
situation under review. On 30 September 1952, with
wool prices at less than one-third of the peak level
reached in March 1951, its member governments agreed
that it should be dissolved.
In the Sulphur Committee, the positions of the United
States and New Zealand were reversed. The United
States was by far the most important exporter of this
commodity; New Zealand was vitally dependent on
adequate supplies for fertilizer manufacture. The Sulphur
Committee, fortunately, did not encounter the difficulties
experienced in the Wool Committee in agreeing upon an
allocation system. Although New Zealand was unable to
obtain as large an allocation as it wished, it would seem
that it had no grounds for complaint that it had been
inequitably treated in the scheme that was devised. In
comparison with imports of 74,000 tons of sulphur in
1950, it was allocated 66,000 tons and 72,700 tons in
1951 and 1952 respectively by the Sulphur Committee.
New Zealand participated in the International Wheat
Agreement from its inception; it is unlikely that this has
had any noticeable effect, favourable or adverse, on
New Zealand’s trade in wheat.
Economic Development
In conclusion, we must consider the attitude which New
Zealand took during this period to the major
international problem of the economic development of
less developed countries. The general impression gained
from a study of the statements of politicians and
representatives of New Zealand at international
conferences and of the action taken by New Zealand in
this field is that, while there was an awareness of the
political, economic and social importance of raising
living standards in the less fortunate areas of the world,
the problem was not yet regarded as of sufficient urgency
to justify New Zealand’s making any very substantial
sacrifice towards its solution.
The Labour Government was not really put to the test
on this question. It was, indeed, comparatively generous
in its contributions to international agencies for
reconstruction and relief in the early post-war period. It
took the side of the underdeveloped countries on trade
and investment policy in the negotiation of the Havana
Charter. It supported the granting of technical assistance
to underdeveloped countries in the United Nations and
in the Specialised Agencies to which it belonged. But it
could not induce its party to join the International Bank,
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the most important international source of finance for
reconstruction and development and a source of technical
aid in the preparation of development plans.
The first really substantial test of New Zealand’s
attitude came in 1950 after the Labour Government’s
defeat when, on the initiative of Australia and Ceylon, it
was decided at a meeting of Commonwealth Foreign
Ministers at Colombo to take positive action to foster
economic development in South and South-East Asia.
On the basis of the development programmes drawn up
by India, Pakistan and Ceylon and the United Kingdom’s
dependent territories in the area, it was estimated at a
meeting in London in September 1950 that these countries
would require external finance, over the six year period
of their plans, amounting to more than £l,000m. The
New Zealand Government was at the time engaged in a
drive for economy in public expenditure. It was only
after some hesitation that it decided to make a contribution
amounting to £3 million over the first three years of the
Plan. Such a sum could not be regarded as over-generous
in the light of the buoyancy of the external trade position
at the time.
A sum of £1 million was appropriated for capital
assistance under the Plan in each subsequent financial
year. This was applied in various directions in several
countries. For instance, by 1957, New Zealand had
helped to finance the establishment of a cement factory,
the purchase of equipment for irrigation projects, and a
livestock and research farm in Pakistan; a medical
research institute and equipment for the dairy industry in
India; a dry farming research station, technical and trade
training schools, and a dental nursing training scheme in
Ceylon; a trade training school in Indonesia; a railway
apprentices school in Cambodia; and a milk collecting
centre in Nepal.
In addition, over 300 trainees in a wide range of
trades and professions had come to New Zealand and
about 60 New Zealand experts had gone to Asia under
the Technical Co-operation Scheme under the Colombo
Plan. Up to March 1956, the Government had spent
£400,000 for this purpose, and would have been willing
to spend more if demand had been as great as was
originally expected.
New Zealand had also contributed in reasonable
measure to the United Nations Expanded Programme of
Technical Assistance and had provided facilities for
training and supplied experts for service overseas in
connection with the technical assistance activities of the
Specialised Agencies.
New Zealand had, therefore, comparatively
speaking, made a substantial contribution in the field
of technical assistance. It had been unwilling,
however, unduly to expand its capital assistance to
underdeveloped countries. As indicated above, it had
limited its appropriations under the Colombo Plan to £1
million per annum and had joined the majority of the
more developed countries in the United Nations in
resisting the introduction of a Special United Nations
Fund for Economic Development. Some compared these
capital assistance expenditures with New Zealand’s
defence expenditures of over £24 million per annum
during the last few years, and questioned whether
adequate weight was being given to the political, strategic
and economic importance of an adequate rate of
development in its northern neighbours.
It remains to consider New Zealand’s attitude to the
regional economic commissions which were set up to
facilitate development in various areas after the war.
New Zealand was not particularly concerned with the
activities of the Economic Commissions for Europe and
Latin America, but it maintained an active interest in the
operations of the Organisation for European Economic
Co-operation, the European Payments Union and the
Schuman Plan. In general, New Zealand’s attitude was
one of support for all these institutions provided
that their operations did not threaten to affect its own
interests adversely.
For example, the movement towards trade
liberalisation in OEEC was welcomed. However,
pressure was exerted on those countries which had not
done so to extend their relaxations of import control to
New Zealand. Again, the request of the Schuman Plan
countries for a waiver of their GATT obligations in
respect of coal and steel was supported. But New Zealand
pressed for safeguards to protect the interests of other
countries and to make it clear that this did not provide a
precedent for similar action in respect of other goods –
especially the ‘Green Pool’ for agricultural products
which had been mooted from time to time.
At the time of writing, the Government was showing
some concern at the agricultural provisions of the
Common Market Treaty being negotiated by Western
Germany, France, Italy and the Benelux countries. These
seemed likely to result in a more restrictive policy
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towards imports of foodstuffs from countries outside
Europe. When the United Kingdom consulted the
Commonwealth about the possibility of the United
Kingdom’s associating itself with other OEEC countries
in an Industrial Free Trade Area, New Zealand appears
to have approved the proposal. But this was on the
understanding that agricultural products would be
excluded, so that existing Commonwealth preferences
could be preserved. Whether the United Kingdom could
succeed in inducing its European partners to agree to
such a provision was only one of the many difficult
problems which remained to be solved in the months
ahead in 1957.
New Zealand’s main direct contacts with regional
economic activity, however, had been in Asia and the
Pacific. It was a member of ECAFE almost since its
inception. The Government’s interest did not appear to
have been great. New Zealand was not represented at all
at the Conference held in Indonesia in February 1953. It
had not yet found it possible to invite the Commission to
meet in New Zealand. It had played a much more active
and constructive part in the South Pacific Commission,
whose activities were to be considered elsewhere in the
book of which this essay was to have been part.
Afterword
It is interesting to look back on what I wrote in the mid-
1950s with the benefit of hindsight. New Zealand’s
attitudes to its role in external affairs were dominated
by two interrelated considerations. The first was the
extent to which the economy had become dependent on
the British market for a few pastoral products. The
second was the priority given in domestic policy to the
objectives of security, full employment and negotiated
‘fair shares’. These objectives were first emphasised by
the Labour governments of 1935 to 1949, but they were
also followed, with somewhat less enthusiasm, by their
National Party successors. The negotiated contracts for
dairy products and meat with the United Kingdom
Government, and guaranteed free access to Britain as
part of the preferential arrangements, were seen as
vital underpinnings for successful pursuit of those
domestic objectives.
Cooperation in sustaining the sterling area was
seen as an important aspect of the key relationship
with Britain. I was not alone in failing to foresee how
quickly the post-war dollar shortage would be
overcome. But the limitations of the British market
for New Zealand’s major exports were already
becoming apparent by 1956.
At the end of our period, the bulk purchase contracts
had been terminated. A downward trend in the
proportion of exports that could be sold in Britain
had already begun. This seemed certain to continue,
whether or not Britain became more protectionist
in agriculture.
It was gradually becoming more widely appreciated
that New Zealand’s future prosperity would increasingly
depend on its success in diversifying the products and
markets through which overseas exchange was earned.
There was less acceptance that this would require
important changes in policy to improve the international
competitiveness of all aspects of the New Zealand
economy. There would continue to be political resistance
to making the changes in the policies that had provided
such security against competition for so many
New Zealand producers.
The importance of making changes was accentuated
when British governments became increasingly
interested, from 1961, in finding means of joining the
newly negotiated European Economic Community.
The foregoing analysis was rightly sceptical about
the possibility of persuading the six continental
countries establishing the original EEC to accept an
Industrial Free Trade Area that would permit Britain
to sustain its preferential system without joining
their Common Agricultural Policy. My analysis was
also correct in anticipating how protectionist the
CAP would be.
The extent of New Zealand’s dependence and the
strong sentimental support it had accorded to Britain in
war and in the early  post-war period undoubtedly
helped New Zealand’s Trade Minister John Marshall
and his successors to negotiate special arrangements for
New Zealand butter, cheese and lamb when Britain
eventually did join the Community. But such
arrangements could only partially slow the inexorable
trend towards a situation where less than 6% of New
Zealand exports were going to Britain later in the century.
Brian Talboys acknowledged the change in progress
in 1980 in a Massey Memorial Lecture entitled
‘Dependence and Security: Independence and
Opportunity’. From that vantage point, he suggested
that we could see more clearly that New Zealand had
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“often unwillingly, and at times unwittingly, been
walking the road to economic maturity”. The road
was probably longer and rockier than he had anticipated.
But important changes were just ahead with the
negotiation of CER with Australia in 1983 and the
radical changes in policy introduced by the Labour
Government in 1984.
Endnotes
1 The tolerances over the last few years of the
contracts were:
1947-48 1,500 tons of butter and 1,000 tons of
cheese food;
1948-49-50 Sales to UK to be not less than 97% of
exportable surplus of butter and cheese;
1950-51 Sales to UK to be not less than 90% of
exportable surplus of butter, with maximum export
of 12,000 tons of cheese elsewhere;
1951-52 Sales to UK to be not less than 85% of
exportable surplus of butter and cheese;
1952-53 Sales to UK to be not less than 87% of
butter and 90% of cheese;
1953-54 Sales to UK to be not less than 90% of
butter and 92 1/2% of cheese.
2 The writer is indebted to Professor H Belshaw’s
unpublished manuscript on Trade Regulation and
Commercial Policy in New Zealand (1939-40) for
information on overseas reactions to the imposition
of control.
3 Cf. NZOYB, pp. 825-828, where it is estimated that
the United States provided lend-lease aid worth
£105m and New Zealand reciprocated with aid
worth £8lm in the March years 1943-46.The
foodstuffs provided by New Zealand were valued
at the relatively low prices then prevailing in New
Zealand.
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